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 2 
Abstract  23 
This study uses systems analysis to design and compare two economic approaches to efficient 24 
management of groundwater and surface water given EU WFD ecological flow requirements. 25 
Under the first approach, all wholesale water users in a river basin face the same volumetric 26 
price for water.  This water price does not vary in space or in time, and surface water and 27 
groundwater are priced at the same rate.  Under the second approach, surface water is priced 28 
using a volumetric price, while groundwater use is controlled through adjustments to the price of 29 
energy, which is assumed to control the cost of groundwater pumping.  For both approaches, 30 
optimization is used to identify optimal prices, with the objective of maximizing welfare while 31 
reducing human water use in order to meet constraints associated with EU WFD ecological and 32 
groundwater sustainability objectives. The second pricing policy, in which the energy price is 33 
used as a surrogate for a groundwater price, shifts a portion of costs imposed by higher water 34 
prices from low value crops to high value crops and from small urban/domestic locations to 35 
larger locations.  Because growers of low value crops will suffer the most from water price 36 
increases, the use of energy costs to control groundwater use offers the advantage of reducing 37 
this burden.  38 
Keywords 39 
Systems analysis, Integrated modeling for water resources management, Water pricing, Positive 40 
Mathematical Programming, EU Water Framework Directive 41 
Introduction 42 
Rogers and Fiering (1986) provided an early review of the uses of systems analysis in water 43 
resources management.  They defined systems analysis as a set of mathematical planning and 44 
 3 
design techniques that includes some formal optimization.  A central feature of systems analysis 45 
that distinguishes it from other forms of simulation used in water resources management is that 46 
it is used to identify alternatives, and not just to evaluate alternatives. Rogers and Fiering noted 47 
that despite an already substantial academic literature, they were able to identify only one study 48 
in which the results of a systems analysis were actually implemented in a project.  A number of 49 
reasons were cited for the failure of systems analysis to gain traction in professional practice, 50 
including limits on the extent to which economic, political, institutional, and environmental 51 
pressures that affect planning and decision-making can be incorporated into the formulation of a 52 
formal optimization problem. 53 
 54 
Since the review by Rogers and Fiering, a substantial literature has documented efforts to 55 
improve the utility of systems analysis in water resources management. While a complete 56 
review is outside the scope of this paper, we would like to highlight two developments that 57 
contribute to the approach presented here.  The first is the development of increasingly 58 
sophisticated methods for incorporating economic information and methods, which has 59 
improved linkages between water resources systems and the broader economic and social 60 
factors that drive water resources development (for recent reviews, see Harou, et al., 2009; Cai, 61 
2008; Booker et al., 2012).  The second is the integration of ecological and other natural systems 62 
models, which has improved understanding of the impacts of water resources development on 63 
natural systems (for a conceptual introduction, see Jakeman and Letcher, 2003; for recent 64 
examples, see Loucks, 2006 and Liu, et al., 2008).     65 
 66 
The European Water Framework Directive (WFD), introduced in 2000 (EU Commission), is a 67 
major legislative effort to require river basin planning that includes consideration of 68 
 4 
hydrological, economic, and ecological components in an integrated framework.  The WFD sets 69 
out objectives for the ecological and chemical status of rivers and requires the use of economic 70 
instruments to achieve these objectives, as well as to provide incentives for efficient use.  The 71 
design of economic instruments to achieve the objectives of the WFD has emerged as a 72 
challenging aspect of implementation (e.g., Heinz et al., 2007; Deronzier et al., 2005; Brouwer, 73 
2004; Ward and Pulido-Velazquez, 2009) and is an area where systems analysis has 74 
considerable potential to contribute to rational design.   75 
 76 
This study builds on a previous effort to design economic instruments to achieve WFD 77 
objectives (Riegels et al., 2011).  In that study, an integrated modeling framework linking 78 
hydrologic, economic, and ecological components was developed, and a robust optimization 79 
approach was used to design a water pricing policy intended to achieve ecological status 80 
objectives of the WFD while providing incentives for efficient water use.  The current study 81 
builds on that effort by introducing a more flexible pricing policy that prices groundwater and 82 
surface water differently.  We estimate the differential impact of this pricing policy by 83 
comparing it to the policy designed in the first study, which applied one volumetric price to all 84 
water uses in a river basin, regardless of whether human water use was supplied by surface 85 
water or groundwater.  In addition, both pricing policies are evaluated using a more flexible 86 
economic model of farmer behavior to estimate how farmers might respond to different water 87 
pricing policies. 88 
 5 
Methods 89 
General approach 90 
Under the first pricing approach considered in this study (hereafter called the Uniform water 91 
pricing policy), all wholesale water users in the basin face the same volumetric price for water.  92 
This water price does not vary in space or in time, and surface water and groundwater are priced 93 
at the same rate.  Under the second approach (hereafter called the Mixed pricing policy), surface 94 
water is priced using a volumetric price, while groundwater use is controlled through 95 
adjustments to the price of energy, which is assumed to control the cost of groundwater 96 
pumping.  For both approaches, optimization is used to set prices, with the objective of 97 
maximizing welfare given constraints associated with EU WFD ecological and groundwater 98 
sustainability objectives.   99 
 100 
The optimization problem (objective function and constraints) that is solved in order to set 101 
prices under both approaches is: 102 
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Equation 1 104 
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In this optimization problem, the decision variables are prices. Under the Uniform pricing 105 
policy, there is only one decision variable: the volumetric price of water. Under the Mixed 106 
pricing policy, there are two decision variables: the volumetric price of surface water, and the 107 
energy price, which is used to control groundwater use. The connection between the decision 108 
variables and the objective function (i.e., the method used to estimate the impact of water prices 109 
on welfare) varies by water use type.  Irrigation, urban/domestic, industry, livestock, and 110 
tourism water use types are represented in the case study basin, and methods used to estimate 111 
the impact of prices on welfare are outlined below. 112 
 113 
We assume that all water users engage in rational economic behavior as defined by 114 
microeconomic theory (e.g., Mas-Colell, et al., 1995). In other words, we assume that all 115 
producers adjust inputs, including water, in order to maximize profits, and that all consumers 116 
adjust consumption, including consumption of water, in order to maximize utility. Therefore, the 117 
amount of water abstracted at each water use location (and the resulting welfare at that location) 118 
is a function of the marginal cost of water.  For all users, we further assume that decisions about 119 
how much water to use are based on expectations about average annual water availability. 120 
 121 
The remainder of the Methods section is organized as follows. First, we provide a brief 122 
description of the case study river basin. Then, we explain the rationale for controlling 123 
groundwater use through energy prices under the Mixed poliy, instead of using a second 124 
volumetric price that is different from the price of surface water. Next, methods used to estimate 125 
the impact of water prices on welfare are described for the irrigation, urban/domestic, and 126 
industry water use types.  (Methods are not described for the livestock and tourism types 127 
because these are similar to those used for industry.)  This is followed by an explanation of how 128 
 7 
we represent ecological status and groundwater status constraints. We conclude the methods 129 
section by summarizing the overall optimization approach and describing methods used to solve 130 
the optimization problem.  131 
Case study data set 132 
This study uses a data set associated with the Aggitis River basin in northern Greece, which is a 133 
tributary of the Strymonas River.  The case study river basin has been described in Riegels et al. 134 
(2011).  The case study data were assembled during 2007 and are representative of conditions in 135 
that year.  The case study data set includes information about irrigation, urban/domestic, 136 
industry, livestock, and tourism water use, as well as about the economic activities associated 137 
with these uses.  The case study basin includes 15 irrigation locations, 19 urban/domestic 138 
locations, 11 industry water use locations, 12 livestock locations, and 2 tourism locations.  A 139 
schematic of the river basin showing the locations of all water use locations is given in Riegels 140 
et al. (2011). 141 
Rationale for controlling groundwater use with energy prices 142 
Under the Mixed pricing policy, groundwater use is controlled with an energy price. We assume 143 
that the depth to groundwater depends on local drawdown only.  The resulting quadratric cost 144 
function facilitates the selection of a profit-maximizing mix of surface water and groundwater 145 
because groundwater is then used at the point where the quadratic pumping cost function is 146 
tangent to the surface water price.  We now present the model used to estimate local drawdown 147 
and groundwater pumping costs. 148 
 149 
We assume that groundwater costs are a function of the energy required to pump groundwater, 150 
which is in turn a function of the depth to groundwater (or pumping lift) and the volume that is 151 
 8 
pumped (pumping rate).  We further assume that the average groundwater level does not change 152 
during the simulation period, so that only local drawdown affects depth to groundwater.  This 153 
assumption is reasonable because of constraints on total groundwater pumping that are 154 
described in the section “Representation of long-term groundwater use constraint” (for an 155 
approach to incorporating other variables affecting pumping depth into a groundwater pumping 156 
cost function, see Basagaoglu, et al., 1999). 157 
 158 
The main aquifer in the case study area is an unconfined aquifer with a mean thickness close to 159 
100 m (Panilas, 1998).  Hydraulic conductivity is assumed to equal 2.16 m/day and specific 160 
yield is assumed to equal 0.011.  Based on results from a detailed groundwater model in the area 161 
(ENM Ltd., 2006), depth to groundwater is estimated to equal about 30 m throughout the study 162 
area.  A pumping efficiency of 0.7 is assumed at all locations.   163 
 164 
To estimate how the depth to groundwater changes at the wells as a function of groundwater 165 
abstraction, we assume no wells interfere (drawdown cones do not overlap) and use Neuman’s 166 
solution for nonequilibrium radial flow in an unconfined aquifer (Neuman, 1974). The 167 
assumption that drawdown cones do not overlap is reasonable given hydrogeological condtions 168 
in the study area because all well are separated by at least 500 m.  We assume that on an average 169 
annual basis, almost all drawdown is a function of gravity drainage and that the late drawdown 170 
portion of Neuman’s solution prevails.  In the late drawdown period, Neuman’s solution is 171 
equivalent to the Cooper-Jacob equation with specific yield substituted for storativity.   172 
 173 
 9 
The Cooper-Jacob equation estimates drawdown at an instantaneous point in time.  To estimate 174 
average drawdown over a given time period, the Cooper-Jacob equation can be integrated with 175 
respect to time.   176 
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Equation 2 178 
 179 
We use the expression for average drawdown given in Equation 2 to estimate the cost of 180 
pumping a given volume of water over a single growing season.   181 
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Equation 3 183 
 184 
Under the Mixed pricing policy, the quadratic cost function that results from using the price of 185 
energy to control the cost of groundwater pumping facilitates the selection of an optimal mix of 186 
surface water and groundwater. If surface water and groundwater were both priced 187 
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volumetrically, then, given the assumptions used in this study, all users would use whichever 188 
source was cheaper. The quadratic cost function allows users to set groundwater use to the point 189 
where the marginal cost of groundwater is equal to the price of surface water, so that each user 190 
is able to select a mix of both supply types.  We assume that users are able to switch between 191 
supply types without difficulty; however, irrigation locations without access to groundwater 192 
(surface water) in the base year data set are assumed to be unable to add surface water 193 
(groundwater) supplies (i.e., only location with both sources in the base year are assumed to 194 
have access to both sources under the pricing scenarios).  We make a final assumption that, if 195 
the area under groundwater irrigation is reduced at a given location, then the number of wells in 196 
production is reduced proportionally. 197 
Estimating the impact of prices on welfare:  Irrigation water use 198 
The welfare at each irrigation water use location is assumed to equal the total land rent minus 199 
the total cost of operating the irrigation system at that location.  Each irrigation location is group 200 
of farmers served by one irrigation system that may have access to groundwater, surface water, 201 
or both.  Each location is assumed to behave as a single profit-maximizing entity.  The total land 202 
rent is the sum of the all the rents received by each of the farmers at the location.   203 
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Equation 4 205 
Land rent is assumed to equal revenue minus water and other input costs. Water costs are prices 206 
paid by famers under either of the two pricing policies simulated here, and are different from the 207 
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costs of operating an irrigation system. We assume that the costs of operating the irrigation 208 
system are covered by revenue from the water pricing policies; these costs therefore do not 209 
affect the decision-making of individual farmers but still impact the overall welfare calculation. 210 
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Equation 5 212 
 213 
Under the Mixed pricing policy, irrigation system supply costs are equal to fixed capital plus 214 
operating costs.  Under the Uniform policy, supply costs are equal to fixed capital and operating 215 
costs plus groundwater pumping costs; we assume that the basin authority implementing the 216 
pricing policy assumes responsibility for pumping costs to ensure that the marginal costs of 217 
groundwater and surface water use are equal. 218 
 219 
Land rents change in response to water price changes as farmers adjust the mix of land, water, 220 
and other inputs to maximize profits.  We model these changes by assuming that the production 221 
of each crop can be modeled as a constant elasticity of substation (CES) production function 222 
with three inputs: land, water, and a third input that aggregates fertilizer, pesticide, seed, fuel, 223 
and labor costs, which are assumed to be used in fixed proportions.  224 
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Equation 6 226 
In Equation 6, the parameters 1 2
, , ,ij ij ij    and 3ij

 are estimated using an approach introduced 227 
by Howitt (1995b).  This approach is based on Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) 228 
(Howitt, 1995a), which assumes that allocations of land, water, and other inputs observed in a 229 
base year data set reflect profit-maximizing behavior; the parameters 1 2
, , ,ij ij ij    and 3ij

 are 230 
then adjusted so that marginal profits are equal across all crop types, as the assumption of profit 231 
maximization requires.  The adjustments are made so that the marginal product of each input is 232 
equal to the observed marginal cost of that input plus shadow prices associated with observed 233 
land allocation contraints and constaints on overall resouce availability.  The elasticity of 234 
substitution,   , is used in this study as a calibration parameter that is adjusted so that crop 235 
yields predicted by the CES production match base year crop yields. 236 
  237 
Land costs are represented using a quadratic cost function: 238 
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In Equation 7, the parameters  ija  and  ijb  are estimated as explained in Howitt (1995b). Howitt’s 241 
approach requires a quadratic land cost function because of the shadow prices on observed land 242 
allocation constraints that are incorporated into the CES production function parameters. These 243 
shadow prices are intended capture inputs to production that are not observable in the base year 244 
data set, such as farmer expertise.  Because these shadow prices are incorporated into the 245 
marginal product of land, it is necessary to parameterize a quadratic land cost function so that 246 
the marginal product of each input is equal to that input’s marginal cost, as required by the 247 
assumption of profit maximization.  We assume no other constraints on the re-allocation of land 248 
to different crop types besides those incorporated into the CES production function and 249 
quadratic land cost function parameters. 250 
 251 
Under the Uniform pricing policy the allocation of land, water, and other inputs to different crop 252 
types at each location is estimated by solving the following optimization problem: 253 
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Equation 8 255 
Water use is then distributed between surface water and groundwater based on use fractions 256 
observed in the base year data set. 257 
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 258 
Under the Mixed pricing policy, the optimization problem in Equation 8 is solved with the 259 
groundwater cost function described in Equation 3 substituted for the volumetric water price: 260 
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Equation 9 262 
The water use level identfied in Equation 9 is partitioned between surface water and 263 
groundwater by setting the marginal cost of groundwater equal to the volumetric surface water 264 
price; groundwater use is then limited to this amount, with the rest supplied by surface water.  265 
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Equation 10 267 
In some cases, it is profit-maximizing to use water at a level where the marginal cost of 268 
groundwater is less than the surface water price.  In these cases, only groundwater is used. 269 
Estimating the impact of prices on welfare:  Urban/domestic water 270 
use 271 
The welfare at each urban/domestic water use location is assumed to equal consumers’ surplus 272 
plus the profit of the water supply agency.  All urban/domestic consumers are assumed to seek 273 
to maximize consumer’s surplus.  The water supply agency is assumed to maximize profits.   274 
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Equation 11 276 
Consumers’ surplus is measured as follows: 277 
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Equation 12 279 
Equation 12 is the integral of a demand function that indicates how much water a household will 280 
consume each month as a function of the price of water.  This function is developed using the 281 
point-expansion method (Griffin, 2006).  The price elasticity of demand is estimated to be -0.5 282 
at all water use locations (for a meta-analysis of price elasticities, see Dalhuisen et al., 2003, 283 
who report a mean value of 0.41).  Because urban/domestic water use is a small portion of total 284 
use in the case study catchment (<5%), we did not investigate the sensitivity of the demand 285 
function to changes in price elasticity. 286 
 287 
A parameter called the “choke price” is used as the upper limit of integration in Equation 12.  288 
The choke price is defined as a price level at which urban/domestic users would substitute an 289 
alternative source of supply, such as bottled water, rainwater collection, or perhaps portable 290 
desalination (e.g., Grafton, 2008).  In this study, the choke price is based on the cost of rainwater 291 
collection and is set equal to 3 €/m3. 292 
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 293 
The method used to estimate water supply agency profits varies depending on the pricing policy 294 
under consideration. All urban/domestic water use locations have access to groundwater 295 
supplies only. Under the Uniform water pricing policy, the profit of a water supply agency is:  296 
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Equation 13 298 
Under the Mixed pricing policy, the profit of the water supply agency is: 299 
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Equation 14 301 
 302 
We assume that each urban/domestic water supply agency operates at the point where marginal 303 
profits equal marginal costs and use this assumption to determine the retail water price. 304 
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Equation 15 306 
This price is substituted into the consumer demand function to estimate wholesale water use as a 307 
function of wholesale water prices. 308 
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 311 
For many urban/domestic water supply entitites, it may not be reasonable to assume that the 312 
entity operates at the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs, due to large fixed 313 
investments that increase average costs of supply.  This problem could be remedied by using a 314 
combination of fixed and variable charges for urban/domestic water supply, as suggested by 315 
Griffin (2006).   316 
Estimating the impact of prices on welfare: Industry water use 317 
Welfare changes for industry water users are measured in terms of changes to profits.   318 
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Equation 17 320 
 321 
Industry water use is estimated by estimating a maximum willingness to pay for water for each 322 
industy and comparing this to the average cost of water supply.  If an industry’s maximum 323 
willingness to pay for water is greater than the average water cost, it is assumed that the industry 324 
will use water at the level identified in the base year data set.  If the average cost of water supply 325 
exceeds maximum willingness to pay, it is assumed that the industry goes out of production and 326 
uses no water.  The maximum willingness to pay for each industry is estimated using the 327 
residual imputation method (Griffin, 2006; Young, 2005).   328 
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Equation 18 330 
This method estimates a maximum willingness-to-pay value that is probably higher than the true 331 
value.  This is because of the difficulty of including all input costs apart from water in the 332 
willingness-to-pay calculation.  The maximum willingness-to-pay should be interpreted as an 333 
upper limit on the value of water and not as a guide to identifying a profit-maximizing level of 334 
water use, as would be implied if marginal costs of water use were used.  The water prices 335 
simulated as part of this study are generally not higher than estimated willingness to pay and, in 336 
fact, only one water-intensive industry in the study area is predicted to go out of business as a 337 
result of increased water costs.  It may be reasonable to assume that a water-intensive industry 338 
would go out of business or relocate to another river basin if water prices were to increase 339 
significantly. 340 
Representation of ecological status constraint 341 
We implement EU WFD ecological status objectives with a model constraint.  Although the 342 
WFD provides definitions of surface water status in terms of a number ecological and chemical 343 
indicators, this analysis only considers WFD requirements with respect to hydrological regime, 344 
which is considered an indicator of ecological status.   The term “hydrological regime” refers to 345 
the pattern of a river’s flow quantity, timing, and variability (Poff et al., 1997). 346 
 347 
We estimate ecological status using an approach based on Arthington et al. (2006) and similar to 348 
the ELOHA approach described in Poff et al. (2010).  Arthington et al. recommend developing 349 
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flow-response relationships that link differences between the distribution of flows in an 350 
unmodified setting and the distribution of flows in a setting where flow patterns are modified by 351 
human abstraction. 352 
 353 
Distributions of monthly flow volumes are used as indicators of natural flow variability.  Flow 354 
patterns in the case study basin are highly seasonal, and significant inter-annual variation also 355 
exists.  Therefore, in an unmodified setting, the distribution of flows in each month should show 356 
significant variation over a long time period, and the range over which flows are distributed 357 
should also vary from month to month.  Unmodified distributions are developed for each reach 358 
in case study basin for each month by running a water resources planning model of the river 359 
basin with all demands set to zero. Because the model is driven by 20 year of historical 360 
hydrology, this is assumed to provide a representative distribution of natural flows.  Modified 361 
distributions are developed by running the model of the case study basin with demands set to 362 
values identified using the economic methods described above.   363 
 364 
To quantify the extent to which modified monthly flow patterns differ from natural patterns, we 365 
develop an indicator to measure the difference between modified and unmodified distributions.  366 
The ecological status of the basin is then quantified using this indicator, which ranges in value 367 
between 0 and 1.  If the ecological status parameter value is equal to zero, then the flow regime 368 
is identical to the natural regime; higher values indicate flows that are increasingly modified.  369 
The optimization is constrained so that the value of the ecological status parameter is less than 370 
0.5.  More details about the method used to estimate ecological status are available in Riegels et 371 
al. (2011).     372 
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Representation of long-term groundwater use constraint 373 
The EU WFD requires that groundwater pumping not exceed long-term rates of recharge.  374 
Long-term impacts of groundwater pumping are evaluated using the water resources planning 375 
model of the case study basin.  The model of the case study basin is divided into 16 376 
subcatchment areas, each of which is assumed to function as an independent groundwater body 377 
that is represented using a double-layer linear reservoir model.    Groundwater recharge and 378 
linear reservoir parameters are based on simulations of groundwater flow developed using a 379 
MIKE SHE model of the Aggitis basin (ENM, Ltd., 2005).  The model is run for a 20-year 380 
period using a sequence of the historical hydrology and demands identified using the methods 381 
described above.  The storage volume of the deep layer at the end of the 20-year simulation 382 
period is used as an indicator of whether groundwater pumping is occuring at a sustainable rate.  383 
The final storage volume is constrained to be within 1% of the initial storage volume for all 384 
groundwater subcatchments.  This small amount of depletion is allowed in order to facilitate a 385 
small amount of temporary groundwater mining as a drought mitigation strategy.   386 
Solution of overall optimization problem 387 
The overall optimization problem is solved using the following iterative approach: 388 
1. Prices are selected. 389 
2. Water use is estimated at all water use locations. 390 
3. Welfare is estimated at all water use locations. 391 
4. Water use estimates are written to the water resources planning model of the case study 392 
basin. 393 
5. The water resources planning model is run for a twenty-year period, forced by historical 394 
hydrology (subcatchment runoff and groundwater recharge). Water use is assumed to 395 
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be constant over the 20-year period, with the exception of irrigation water use, which 396 
varies depending on hydrological conditions. 397 
6. The groundwater constraint is checked. If the constraint is not met, steps 1-5 are repeated 398 
with new prices. 399 
7. The ecological status constraint is checked. If the constraint is not met, steps 1-6 are 400 
repeated with new prices.  401 
8. Basin-wide welfare is compared to welfare estimated under other prices for which the 402 
groundwater and ecological status constraints have been met.  403 
The above steps continue until prices are found that maximize basin-wide welfare while 404 
satisfying constraints. Water use and welfare calculations are performed in Matlab.  The 405 
optimization uses a gradient search algorithm that is part of the Matlab software package (The 406 
Math Works, 2011).  The river basin simulation model is developed using the software package 407 
MIKE BASIN (DHI, 2011).  An overview of the optimization process is given in Figure 1.   408 
Results 409 
Prices identified both pricing policies are presented in Table 1.  The table also presents estimates 410 
of basin-wide welfare.  The optimal surface water price under the Mixed pricing policy is higher 411 
than the optimal water price identified under the Uniform pricing policy.  The Mixed pricing 412 
policy predicts more total water use because some crops that are not profitable to grow under the 413 
Uniform policy become profitable under the Mixed policy due to the availability of low 414 
marginal cost groundwater supplies.  The resulting increased use of groundwater reduces 415 
groundwater discharge to the river system, which means that surface water use must be limited 416 
by a higher surface water price in order to meet the ecological status constraint. 417 
 418 
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The impact of introducing a separate price for groundwater is illustrated in Table 2, which 419 
presents aggregated crop areas and water use for all irrigation water locations that have access to 420 
both surface water and groundwater. We compare results when the Uniform policy’s price and 421 
the Mixed policy’s surface water price are both equal to 0.10 €/m3.  The table shows that a 422 
number of crops predicted to go out of production under the Uniform policy are still active 423 
under the Mixed policy.  These crops, which include cotton, maize, and fodder, are all predicted 424 
to use groundwater but not surface water.  Although it is not profitable to grow these crops when 425 
the marginal cost of water is equal to 0.10 €/m3, continued production is possible if groundwater 426 
use is restricted to small amounts that limit drawdown and resulting marginal pumping costs.  427 
Because total water use is higher, the surface water price must be increased to 0.12 €/m3 under 428 
the Mixed pricing policy to reduce surface water use to the point that ecological constraints are 429 
satisfied. 430 
 431 
Marginal costs of water for each crop type are presented in Table 3, which compares marginal 432 
costs at one location under the Mixed pricing policy when the surface water price is equal to 433 
0.10 €/m3 and the energy price is equal to 0.39 €/kWh.  The table shows that the marginal cost 434 
of water use is less than the surface water price for many crop types under the Mixed policy.  435 
All of these crops are assumed to use groundwater only.   436 
 437 
Retail water prices estimated under both pricing policies are presented in Table 4.  .  Prices 438 
observed under the Mixed policy are positively correlated with water use.  Higher retail water 439 
prices are estimated in locations with high water use because high water use increases 440 
groundwater pumping and drawdown.  All urban/domestic water use locations are supplied by 441 
groundwater only.   442 
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Discussion  443 
We compared two pricing policies in this study to investigate whether pricing groundwater and 444 
surface water differently might have beneficial welfare impacts.  Our results suggest that there 445 
are indeed differences between the Uniform pricing policy, in which all wholesale water users in 446 
the basin face the same volumetric price, and the Mixed pricing policy, in which groundwater 447 
use is controlled through the price of energy.  Both policies predict significant impacts to the 448 
agriculture sector.  Both policies also predict that these impacts will be concentrated on low 449 
value crops such as maize, cotton, and fodder.  However, the Mixed policy predicts that it will 450 
be profitable to continue growing these crops at reduced levels while the first policy predicts 451 
that these crops will go out of production entirely.  It is frequently claimed that low value crops 452 
will not be profitable if environmental costs are internalized in irrigation water prices (e.g., in 453 
Spain, Gomez and Limon, 2004, and in Greece, Latinopoulos, 2008), a conclusion that is 454 
supported by this study.  If water pricing is to be introduced as a tool for controlling water use, 455 
this study suggests that using an energy price to control groundwater use will reduce impacts on 456 
growers of low value crops. 457 
 458 
Water supply varies in time and space, and water prices that give scarcity signals during times 459 
and locations where scarcity is higher could improve efficiency.  The spatial and temporal 460 
variability of water supply have not been considered in the pricing policies investigated here.  It 461 
is possible that basin-wide welfare could be increased, for example, by reduced groundwater 462 
pumping costs in subcatchments where groundwater use results in minimal impacts on 463 
associated surface water resources.  It might also be possible to increase welfare by using 464 
pricing to implement a conjunctive management strategy in which price signals encourage 465 
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surface water use during wet years and groundwater use during dry years (e.g., Schuck and 466 
Green, 2002). 467 
 468 
On the other hand, the introduction of temporally and/or spatially varying prices would be more 469 
computationally demanding and perhaps difficult to implement in real-world practice.  More 470 
prices would introduce more decision variables into the modeling framework presented here, 471 
which would make it more difficult to ensure a globally optimal solution.  It was straightforward 472 
to check the optima found by the gradient search algorithm used in this study because the 473 
number of decision variables was never greater than two.  With a larger number of decision 474 
variables, a gradient search method might not be appropriate.  In addition, more decision 475 
variables would increase the number of model iterations needed to converge to an optimal 476 
solution.  Although our approach could easily be extended to optimize more prices, we have 477 
limited the number of prices to two to ensure computational efficiency and obtain a result that 478 
could be implemented in the basin. 479 
 480 
Because the economic impacts of both pricing policies are concentrated in the agriculture sector, 481 
we should to ask whether the model of farmer behavior used here is reasonable.  The CES 482 
production function approach used here predicts that low value crops will go out of production 483 
or else will be grown on much smaller areas in response to higher water prices.  The approach 484 
also predicts that high value crops will continue to be grown at levels that are close to levels 485 
observed in the baseline data set.  If high value crops are still profitable at higher water prices, 486 
then it is interesting that the approach does not predict that the areas of these crops will increase 487 
as low value crops go out of production.  Instead, it predicts that land allocated to low value 488 
irrigated crops in the base year is converted to dry land agriculture.  The approach is constrained 489 
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by parameters estimated using Positive Mathematical Programming that are calibrated to base 490 
year conditions and are intended to represent hidden factors such as land quality, management 491 
ability, and entrepreneurial skill that are not observable in the baseline data set.  There is some 492 
evidence that the production of high-value crops is riskier and more complex than the 493 
production of low value crops and also requires high-quality soils (Young, 2005).  For these 494 
reasons, it may be reasonable to predict that many farmers will not be able to convert to high 495 
value crop production.  However, the assumption that land allocated to low value irrigated crops 496 
can be converted to dryland agriculture assumes that land used to grow cotton and maize can be 497 
converted to wheat production, which may or may not be reasonable depending on soil 498 
conditions and other factors. 499 
Conclusion 500 
This study demonstrates the application of a systems analysis approach to identify water prices 501 
that allocate scarce water resources efficiently while constraining human water uses so that 502 
ecological and groundwater sustainability goals are met.  The systems analysis approach is also 503 
used to compare two economic approaches (pricing policies) to the management of groundwater 504 
and surface water in a river basin.  The Mixed pricing policy, in which the energy price is used 505 
as a surrogate for a groundwater price, shifts a portion of costs imposed by water prices from 506 
low value crops to high value crops and from small urban/domestic locations to larger locations.  507 
Because growers of low value crops will suffer the most from water price increases, the use of 508 
energy costs to control groundwater use offers the advantage of reducing this burden.  509 
 26 
Acknowledgements 510 
The authors would like to thank the Danish Research School of Water Resources (FIVA) for 511 
financial support.  Three anonymous reviewers contributed helpful suggestions that were 512 
incorporated into the revised version. 513 
514 
 27 
References 515 
Arthington,A.H., Bunn,S.E., Poff,N.L., and Naiman,R.J., 2006. The challenge of providing 516 
environmental flow rules to sustain river ecosystems. Ecological Applications, 16 (4): 1311-517 
1318. 518 
Basagaoglu, H., Marino, M.A., Shumway, R.H., 1999. delta-Form approximating problem for a 519 
conjunctive water resource management model. Advances in Water Resources 23, 69-81. 520 
Booker, J. F., R. E. Howitt, et al. 2012. Economics and the modeling of water resources and 521 
policies. Natural Resource Modeling 25(1): 168-218. 522 
Brouwer, R., 2004. The concept of environmental and resource cost:  Lessons learned from 523 
ECO2.  In:  Brouwer, R. (Ed.), Environmental and Resource Cost and the Water Framework 524 
Directive. An Overview of European Practices. Amsterdam, Holland, RIZA Working Paper 525 
2004.112x.  526 
Cai, X., 2008. Implementation of holistic water resources-economic optimization models for 527 
river basin management - Reflective experiences. Environmental Modelling and Software 23, 2-528 
18. 529 
Dalhuisen,J.M., Florax,R.J.G.M., de Groot,H.L.F., and Nijkamp,P., 2003. Price and income 530 
elasticities of residential water demand: A meta-analysis. Land Economics, 79 (2): 292-308. 531 
Deronzier P., Feuilette S, and Chegrani P., 2005. Environmental costs:  from theory to practice 532 
in France. In: Second international workshop on implementing economic analysis in the water 533 
framework directive, 17-18. 2-1-2004. Paris, France.  534 
 28 
DHI, 2011. MIKE BASIN user manual.  Hørsholm, Denmark.  535 
ENM Ltd., 2006. Water Balance. Volume IV: Water District of Eastern Macedonia, June 2006 536 
(in Greek).  2006.  537 
EU Commission, 2000. Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 538 
23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. 539 
Official Journal L 327 , 22/12/2000 P. 0001 - 0073.   540 
Gomez-Limon,J.A. and Riesgo,L., 2004. Irrigation water pricing: differential impacts on 541 
irrigated farms. Agricultural Economics, 31 (1): 47-66. 542 
Grafton, R.Q., Ward, M.B., 2008. Prices versus rationing: Marshallian surplus and mandatory 543 
water restrictions. Economic Record 84, S57-S65. 544 
Griffin, RC. Water Resource Economics.  2006. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press.  545 
Harou, J.J., Pulido-Velazquez, M., Rosenberg, D.E., Medellin-Azuara, J., Lund, J.R., Howitt, 546 
R.E., 2009. Hydro-economic models: Concepts, design, applications, and future prospects. 547 
Journal of Hydrology 375, 627-643. 548 
Heinz,I., Pulido-Velazquez,M., Lund,J.R., and Andreu,J., 2007. Hydro-economic modeling in 549 
river basin management: Implications and applications for the European Water Framework 550 
Directive. Water Resources Management, 21 (7): 1103-1125. 551 
Howitt,R.E., 1995a. Positive Mathematical-Programming. American Journal of Agricultural 552 
Economics, 77 (2): 329-342. 553 
 29 
Howitt,R.E., 1995b. A Calibration Method for Agricultural Economic Production Models. 554 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 46 (2): 147-159. 555 
Jakeman, A. J. and R. A. Letcher 2003. Integrated assessment and modelling: features, 556 
principles and examples for catchment management. Environmental Modelling and Software 557 
18(6): 491-501. 558 
Latinopoulos,D., 2008. Estimating the Potential Impacts of Irrigation Water Pricing Using 559 
Multicriteria Decision Making Modelling. An Application to Northern Greece. Water Resources 560 
Management, 22 (12): 1761-1782. 561 
Liu, Y., Gupta, H., Springer, E., Wagener, T., 2008. Linking science with environmental 562 
decision making: Experiences from an integrated modeling approach to supporting sustainable 563 
water resources management. Environmental Modelling and Software 23, 846-858. 564 
Loucks, D.P., 2006. Modeling and managing the interactions between hydrology, ecology and 565 
economics. Journal of Hydrology 328, 408-416. 566 
Mas-Colell, A, Whinston, MD, and Green, JR., 1995. Microeconomic Theory. New York, 567 
Oxford University Press.  568 
Neuman, S. P. 1974. Effect of partial penetration on flow in unconfined aquifers considering 569 
delayed gravity response. Water Resources Research, 10(2): 303-12. 570 
Panilas, S. Groundwater problems during lignite exploitations in the open pit mines:  The case 571 
of Drama's lignite deposit. PhD thesis.  School of Geology, University of Patras, Greece.  1998.  572 
Poff, N.L., Richter, B.D., Arthington, A.H., Bunn, S.E., Naiman, R.J., Kendy, E., Acreman, M., 573 
Apse, C., Bledsoe, B.P., Freeman, M.C., Henriksen, J., Jacobson, R.B., Kennen, J.G., Merritt, 574 
 30 
D.M., O'Keeffe, J.H., Olden, J.D., Rogers, K., Tharme, R.E., Warner, A., 2010. The ecological 575 
limits of hydrologic alteration (ELOHA): a new framework for developing regional 576 
environmental flow standards. Freshwater Biology 55, 147-170. 577 
Poff,N.L., Allan,J.D., Bain,M.B., Karr,J.R., Prestegaard,K.L., Richter,B.D., Sparks,R.E., and 578 
Stromberg,J.C., 1997. The natural flow regime. Bioscience, 47 (11): 769-784. 579 
Riegels,N., Jensen,R., Bensasson,L., Banou,S., Moeller,F., and Bauer-Gottwein,P., 2011. 580 
Estimating resource costs of compliance with EU WFD ecological status requirements at the 581 
river basin scale. Journal of Hydrology, 396 (3-4): 197-214. 582 
Rogers, P. P. and M. B. Fiering 1986. Use of systems analysis in water management."Water 583 
Resources Research 22(9): S146-S158. 584 
Schuck, E.C., Green, G.P., 2002. Supply-based water pricing in a conjunctive use system: 585 
implications for resource and energy use. Resource and Energy Economics 24, 175-192. 586 
The Math Works, Inc., 2011. Matlab optimization toolbox user's guide.  Natick, MA.  587 
Ward,F.A. and Pulido-Velazquez,M., 2009. Incentive pricing and cost recovery at the basin 588 
scale. Journal of Environmental Management, 90 (1): 293-313. 589 
Young,R.A., 2005. Determining the Economic Value of Water:  Concepts and Methods. 590 
Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. 591 
 34
 
 
Parameter Baseline Pricing policy 1 Pricing policy 2
Optimal water price 
(€/m3) not applied 0.10 0.12
Optimal energy price 
(€/kWh) not applied not applied 1.13
Basin-wide welfare 
(1000 €) 8.12E+04 6.85E+04 6.91E+04  
Table 1:  Comparison of optimal water prices and welfare. 
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Land use (ha)
Water use 
(1000 m3) Land use (ha)
Water use 
(1000 m3) Land use (ha)
Groundwater use 
(1000 m3)
Surface water 
use (1000 m3)
Total water use 
(1000 m3)
Vineyards 664 3716 624 2502 630 834 1885 2719
Cotton 1783 9658 0 0 155 581 0 581
Trees (pear, apple, 
cherry, walnut) 134 1016 131 737 132 878 0 878
Trees (peach, 
almond, chestnut, 
plum) 121 937 117 630 119 742 22 763
Olives 658 4248 193 639 300 991 186 1177
Sugar beet 1819 12128 1183 4212 1231 1392 3413 4805
Maize 12007 63173 0 0 152 785 0 785
Tobacco Virginia, 
Burley 149 611 144 396 146 491 0 491
Vegetables 303 1732 304 1739 307 1054 841 1895
Fodder 200 1550 14 31 60 275 0 275
Pulses 36 152 34 99 36 144 0 144
Potatoes 1355 6321 1326 5418 1340 975 4870 5845
Cereals 16800 0 32627 0 32090 0 0 0
Tomatoes 102 430 87 230 96 342 0 342
Clover 2005 15403 1352 4655 1343 1446 3772 5218
Totals 38137 121074 38136 21290 38137 10928 14988 25917
Crop
Baseline
First pricing policy, water 
price=0.10
Second water pricing policy, water price=0.10 €/m3, energy 
price=0.39 €/kWh
 
Table 2:  Comparison of aggregated land and water use at all irrigation water use locations with access to both surface water and groundwater.  Under 
second water pricing policy, energy price is set to the optimal price:  0.39 €/kWh. 
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Marginal cost of water 
use (€/m3) Groundwater use (m3) Surface water use (m3)
Vineyards 0.10 258 608
Cotton 0.07 119 0
Trees (peach, 
almond, chestnut, 
plum) 0.10 258 22
Olives 0.10 258 2
Sugar beet 0.10 516 1843
Maize 0.05 376 0
Tobacco Virginia, 
Burley 0.07 136 0
Vegetables 0.10 258 635
Fodder 0.06 81 0
Pulses 0.05 13 0
Potatoes 0.08 141 0
Cereals not irrigated not irrigated not irrigated
Tomatoes 0.08 181 0
Crop
Pricing policy 2, water price=0.10 €/m3, energy price=0.39 €/m3
 
 
Table 3:  Comparison of marginal costs of water use at irrigation water use location 375. 
Table 3
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Water use 
location
Retail water price, 
baseline (€/m3)
Retail water price, 
pricing policy 1 
(€/m3)
Retail water price, 
pricing policy 2 
(€/m3)
1 0.45 0.17 0.14
2 0.43 0.17 0.23
3 0.45 0.17 0.20
4 0.45 0.19 0.26
5 0.45 0.33 1.02
6 0.28 0.28 0.43
7 0.28 0.26 0.29
8 0.43 0.28 0.60
9 0.28 0.23 0.23
10 0.30 0.19 0.24
11 0.45 0.19 0.29
12 0.28 0.28 0.53
13 0.45 0.17 0.07
14 0.30 0.19 0.24
15 0.43 0.28 0.19
16 0.43 0.28 0.30
17 0.28 0.28 0.25
18 0.28 0.23 0.11
19 0.28 0.23 0.12  
Table 4:  Comparison of retail water prices for urban/domestic users. The retail water price refers to water prices paid by households at each 
urban/domestic use location.  All urban/domestic water use locations are supplied by groundwater only. 
Table 4
Click here to download Table: Table4.pdf 
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Figure 1:  Solution of overall optimization problem. 
Figure 1
Click here to download Figure: Figure1.pdf 
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Dear Editor, 
 
We are pleased to submit a revised version of the article formerly titled “COMPARISON 
OF TWO WATER PRICING POLICIES IN A HYDRO-ECONOMIC MODELING 
STUDY” and now titled “A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPROACH TO THE DESIGN OF EFFICIENT 
WATER PRICING POLICIES UNDER THE EU WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE” by Niels 
Riegels et al. We thank you and the reviewers for the substantial and thoughtful 
comments, which helped us to significantly improve the manuscript. Please find below a 
detailed explanation of how we have addressed the individual issues. The review 
comments are listed in normal font and our replies in bold font. 
 
We think that all problems have been resolved satisfactorily and we are looking forward 
to your final decision on this article. 
 
Best Regards, 
 
Niels Riegels 
 
Comments from Associate Editor: 
 
This paper has been well served by three reviewers. I believe a careful follow of their comments 
and suggestions will lead to an improved paper. In addition, please address in general how this 
paper contribute to the special issue topic: systems analysis for watershed management. Some 
literature review relating the focus of this paper to general system approaches for watershed 
management will be appreciated. I look forward to receiving your revision. 
 
We have completely re-written the introduction to give some background on 
systems analysis for water resources management; outline important recent 
developments that have contributed to the approach presented in this paper; 
present some of the challenges and opportunities for systems analysis presented by 
the EU WFD; and describe how our paper contributes to the development of 
systems analysis approaches for designing economic tools for efficient water use. 
 
Comments from Reviewer 1: 
 
The paper describes the identification of a water price based on the impacts of the chosen water 
price on water uses for various water uses (irrigated agriculture and the environment, but also 
tourism, domestic, industry, livestock water uses. Environment relates to groundwater level and 
other environmental uses).  The one price identified is then used to run the model for 20 years 
on a daily time step. This appears to be a very cumbersome approach to identify prices that 
maximize economic returns (irrigation, domestic, industry, tourism) and minimize ecological 
*Response to Reviewers Comments
Click here to download Response to Reviewers Comments: Revision_comments_NDR.doc 
damage. The authors acknowledge that prices should vary across space and time, but the prices 
chosen in the modeling approach do not vary.   
 
We have added an explanation of why we did not use prices that vary in space and 
time to the discussion section (lines 469-479). 
 
The PMP approach chosen to identify irrigated crops and the use of energy costs instead of 
water prices for groundwater are well done. However, I do not agree that using energy prices 
instead of water prices would be a policy solution to be recommended in this basin. Why not 
use differential water prices for groundwater and surface water?  
 
We have added a new section explaining the rationale for using an energy price to 
control groundwater use instead of a second volumetric price (lines 142-197). 
 
At this point it is not clear to the reader what the innovation of the study is compared to 
previous hydro-economic modeling studies, some of which the authors list.  
 
The introduction has been re-written to argue for how systems analysis can 
contribute to the design of economic approaches for efficient water management 
under the EU WFD and how this paper contributes to this effort. 
 
The authors also need to state the relative innovation/difference compared to the Riegels et al. 
(2011) paper that is mentioned. 
 
We have added a paragraph to the introduction (lines 77-88) explaining how this 
paper is different from the 2011 paper. 
 
P1, line 22, "throughout a river basin", please change to "in a river basin" 
   
We have made this change. 
 
P2, line 27, suggest to delete "type" (regardless of water use) 
 
This has been re-written to make it clear that “type” does not refer to water use type 
(i.e., domestic, irrigation, etc.) but rather to the source of water (surface water or 
groundwater).   
 
P2, line 29, "the price of energy"; is the meaning here "the cost of energy to pump 
groundwater"?  
 
We have tried to make this more clear by stating that we assume that the price of 
energy controls the cost of groundwater pumping. 
 
P2, line 33, "the impact of water use changes on", better "impact of water use changes as a 
result of pricing policy on " 
 
We have removed the original sentence in which this phrase was found. We now 
make a general reference to EU WFD ecological status constraints and no longer 
describe how we implement these constraints. 
 
P2, line 35 "an optimization approach.. to identify prices". How many prices are identified?  
 
We have added text to the Methods section (lines 105-112) to make it clear that we 
are talking about either one price (the Uniform pricing policy) or two prices (the 
Mixed pricing policy). 
 
P2, line 39 "distribution of opportunity costs" -not clear  
 
We have removed the term “opportunity costs” and summarized the differences in 
welfare impacts between the two pricing policies explicitly. 
 
P4, line 68, please clarify if water use refers to withdrawals or depletion/consumptive use  
 
We have removed this discussion from the introduction so this comment is no longer 
relevant. We decided to leave out the discussion of the importance of the irrigation 
sector in order to focus on the issues summarized in our response to the Associate 
Editor’s comments. 
 
P5, line 89/90, please slightly rephrase, districts are not systems  
 
We have removed this discussion from the introduction so this comment is no longer 
relevant. We decided to leave out the discussion of the pros and cons of different 
irrigation water pricing schemes, again to focus on the issues summarized in our 
response to the Associate Editor’s comments. 
 
P5, line 96, which examples are there in Europe? 
 
We have removed this discussion from the introduction so this comment is no longer 
relevant.  We had thought that we had identified an example of real-world 
implementation of full marginal cost pricing in Spain; however, after reviewing a 
description again, we realized that the implementation was not consistent with the 
definition of full-marginal cost pricing. Again, we have decided not to focus on the 
pros and cons of different water pricing schemes in the introduction in favor of a 
concise argument for how our approach contributes to systems analysis for water 
resources management and the use of systems analysis to design economic 
approaches to implement the EU WFD. 
 
P5, lines 99-100, how did these studies treat environmental use/relate to the WFD? 
 
We have removed this discussion from the introduction so this comment is no longer 
relevant. These studies only considered the impacts of introducing higher 
volumetric water prices in the water sector; assumptions about environmental water 
use requirements or values were not integrated into any of the approaches. 
However, all studies were motivated by the water pricing goals of the WFD and 
acknowledged that the purpose of introducing volumetric pricing would be to 
provide incentives for efficient use and increase the amount of water available for 
environmental purposes. 
 
P6, lines 109-118, why is the shadow price not used as a water price?  
 
We have added text to the methods section making it clear that water prices are the 
decision variables in the optimization problem, which is why shadow prices cannot 
be used (lines 105-112). 
 
P6, line 123, how are welfare changes defined for the various users? Which are the water users 
apart from the environment and agriculture in the basin? 
 
We have changed the structure of the Methods section so that the description of 
methods used for each water use type begins with the welfare measure used. In 
addition, we now provide a list of the different water use types for which welfare 
changes are estimated near the beginning of the Methods section (lines 110-112). 
 
P7, line 137. Please describe what is new/different in this paper compared to Riegels et al. 
(2011) that also relates to ecological flows and uses the same data.  
 
We have a added a paragraph to the discussion section explaining what is new and 
different in this paper compared to the 2011 paper (lines 77-88). 
 
P7, line 144. "Predicting groundwater drawdown"—Suggest to change title. We might predict 
climate or climate change, but we generally do not predict groundwater drawdown. Maybe 
replace with "Assessing groundwater drawdown" 
 
We changed the title of this section to “Rationale for controlling groundwater use 
with energy prices. 
 
P7, line 144: Please describe how many wells are in the system and if farmers have access to 
both, surface and groundwater, or how the system is laid out. From p. 12, line 214, it appears 
that all farmers can effortlessly switch between surface water and groundwater irrigation?  
 
We have not described how many wells are in the system because of space 
constraints (this would require a table). We have stated that we assume that the 
number of wells is reduced in proportion to the size of the area irrigated by 
groundwater. We also state that we assume that water users can switch effortlessly 
between surface water and groundwater at locations where both sources are 
observed to be used in the baseline data set. These assumptions are presented in 
lines 185-197. 
 
P14, line 256 repeats line 250 (marginal costs equal marginal benefits)  
 
We have re-stated this to avoid repetitive language (lines 303-306). 
 
P19, line 369, remove ".",  
 
We have made this change. 
 
P19, line 371, change Cotton to cotton, etc. 
 
We have made this change. 
 
P 19, line 374, if it is feasible to pump groundwater to irrigate fodder, then the energy price is 
either very low, or other pumping costs, such as labor and machinery are not included? Please 
explain. 
 
We think it is not necessary to make changes in response to this comment. We think 
it is clear from the text that it is feasible to irrigate fodder and other crops using 
groundwater because the marginal cost of pumping is low. 
 
P21, line 411. The suggestion is that instead of a water price an energy price should be used for 
groundwater. What is the implied water price of the energy price used?   
 
We have added text to the Methods section making it clear that the assumption of 
profit maximization means that the marginal cost of groundwater use is less than or 
equal to the surface water price (lines 263-269). We have summarized marginal 
costs of water use for one irrigation water use location given a surface water price of 
0.10 €/m^3 in Table 3. We have summarized the impact of using energy prices to 
control groundwater on retail water prices for urban/domestic use locations in 
Table 4. 
 
Generally, groundwater pumping is more costly but also more efficient (higher water-use-
efficiency). What is the difference in the case study basin. Please explain.  
 
We think it is not necessary to make changes in response to this comment. 
Groundwater irrigation only needs be more efficient if it is more expensive to use 
groundwater than surface water. Here, we are assuming that the marginal costs of 
groundwater use are less than or equal to the marginal costs of surface water use. 
 
P32, Table 4, please explain the baseline water price. Is this what users are currently paying? 
(appears high for irrigation). 
 
We have added text to the caption for Table 4 that makes it clear that the prices 
described as “baseline” water prices are retail water prices paid by urban/domestic 
consumers (households). 
Comments from Reviewer 2: 
 
The paper "Comparison of two water pricing policies in a hydro-economic modelling study" by 
Riegels et al. seeks to test two pricing policies in order to meet water pricing objectives of the 
European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD).  I appreciate the straightforward goal of the 
paper.  My comments mainly concern the implications of the modeling study and how to modify 
the manuscript to have a better applicability for the readership base. 
 
1. As a suggestion, the authors may want to consider changing the title of the paper to reflect 
the WFD goal or to highlight the purpose of the pricing schemes.  Specifically the phrase "in a 
hydro-economic modelling study" could be modified to better reflect the motivations of the 
paper and perhaps attract a larger audience (since the use of a hydro-economic model is fairly 
obvious here).   
 
We have proposed a new title. 
 
Another clarifying point could be to give the two pricing policies a descriptive name (instead of 
referring to them as the first policy and the second policy). 
 
We have given both pricing policies descriptive names. 
 
2.  The authors may also want to reduce some repetitive language in the text; "it is assumed" is 
used quite frequently. 
 
We used the active voice as much as possible in this revised version. 
 
3.  [page 3, line 61-62]  This study assumes that under classical economic theory, customers 
have full knowledge of the water pricing and have full knowledge of how they can change their 
water use to best maximize their utility and producers modify their behavior to maximize the 
profit.  I would like to see the authors make a comment on the real-world applicability of this 
assumption.  While I value the insight that studies such as this one can lend on how economic 
optima can inform policy making, the optimal conditions from the model result are often 
surprising.  For example, Table 2 suggests that location 375's allocation of land to cotton would 
decrease from 620 ha to 0 under the first pricing policy, while the allocation to cereals more 
than doubles from 5752 ha to 12792 ha.  Since the policy recommendations for the WFD hinge 
on the results of the optimization model, the tacit assumption is that such changes are plausible.  
How difficult is it for farmers to make such a change?  Do the farmers know that their current 
crop decisions are suboptimal?  This is a general comment that can be addressed with a few 
lines explaining the implication of the rationality assumption at the beginning of the manuscript. 
 
We do not assume that current crop decisions are sub-optimal. They only become 
that way once the new pricing policies are introduced. We added a sentence to make 
it clear that the base year cropping pattern is assumed to be profit-maximizing in 
lines 228-232.  We added text to make it clear that we assume no other constraints 
on re-allocation of land beside those incorporated into the CES production function 
and quadratic cost function parameters in lines 248-250.  We have added a sentence 
to acknowledge that the assumption that cotton and maize can be converted to 
wheat may not be reasonable in the Discussion section (lines 496-499).  We have 
added a paragraph to make it clear that we assume economic rationality in the 
beginning of the methods section (lines 114-120). 
  
4.  [pages 4-5, lines 87-91] The phrase "which are generally pressurized..." should be rewritten 
for clarity. 
 
We have removed the discussion in which this phrase was found from the 
introduction so this comment is no longer relevant. We removed the discussion of 
water pricing from the introduction in order to focus on how this paper contributes 
to systems analysis for water management and the design of economic instruments 
to implement the EU WFD. 
 
5.  [page 5, line 102] "A general conclusion..." if the agricultural water demand is not elastic with 
respect to price, is it a safe assumption to make that the farmers will fully adjust their practices 
when water price changes? (Or rather, if they do follow the elasticity, and the elasticity is not 
high, are price changes worth making?)   
 
We have removed this discussion from the introduction so the comment is no longer 
relevant. However, we were not trying to say that irrigation water use is price 
inelastic in general—only that irrigation water use by low value, high water use 
irrigated crops is inelastic.  We make this point in the Discussion section (lines 481-
484). 
 
Later in the manuscript [page 14, line 246], the authors state a constant elasticity for all water 
uses.  It would seem that based on the citation in line 102 that there may be a different 
elasticity for municipal versus agricultural use. 
 
We do not use elasticities to model economic behavior or welfare impacts for any 
water use categories besides urban/domestic. We did not add additional text to 
clarify this because of space constraints and because we think it should be clear 
from a close reading of the Methods section. 
 
6. [page 9, line 184] Use of Positive Mathematical Programming - Beyond the citations of the 
Howitt articles, the authors may want to expand upon what data was used to set the alpha and 
beta variables.  In the seminal article, PMP was used to match the base-year crop allocations in a 
manner consistent with economic theory.  Does such data exist in this case study?  I'm assuming 
that it does, but this may be confusing to the readers without further explanation. 
 
We have added a brief explanation of how land allocation and resource constraints 
observed in the base year data set are used to estimate the values of the CES 
production function parameters (lines 227-236). 
 
7. [Discussion Section] For clarity, the statements made in the discussion section should refer 
back to prior concepts in the manuscript.  For example, I would recommend reiterating the 
differences between the first and second policy in the beginning of this section.  "The 
distribution of welfare impacts ... is different" is fairly obvious, so some of these lines can be 
omitted for a more precise comparison of the policies.  Also, the authors refer to the PMP 
approach on lines 430-445 without reminding the readers what that approach is.  I would also 
reconsider starting those sentences with "The PMP approach" -- the authors have created a 
model using the PMP approach, but the results quote in this section are really results from the 
model and not from the generic PMP calibration method.  The whole use of PMP in this paper, 
as pointed in comment 6, should be better explained, with the assumptions behind the 
approach clearly stated. 
 
We have added a review of differences between the two pricing policies to the 
beginning of the Discussion section (lines 444-448). We have changed the reference 
to the “PMP approach” given in the Discussion section to a reference to a “CES 
production function approach” (lines 482-483), and have added a reminder to the 
readers that we estimate parameters of the CES production function using Positive 
Mathematical Programming (line 490). We think the expanded description of how 
we estimate the parameters of the CES production function and associated 
quadratic land cost function (lines 227-250) provides a clear explanation of the 
assumptions behind PMP and how the method was used in this paper. 
 
8. [page 22, lines 425-428] "Although the WFD..." This assertion needs some justification. If the 
authors are using economic theory to justify not valuing environmental flows, they should 
expand upon this theory here.  It doesn't seem like there is enough evidence to support their 
statement as written. 
 
We were not making any conclusions about whether valuation of environmental 
flows is appropriate. We were only saying that it appears to us that the WFD 
guidance is inconclusive about whether environmental water use values should be 
internalized in water prices.  However, we decided to remove this paragraph 
because it is not part of the main argument of the paper and we want to avoid 
unnecessary confusion. 
 
9. [Table 4] There may be a better way to show the data in Table 4.  What locations do the 
numbered locations (e.g. 286, 287..) refer to? 
 
The numbering referred to ID numbers that we used in our model. We changed the 
numbering of the water use locations to 1-15 to avoid confusion. 
 
10. [Figure 2] Is there a way to quantify the differences between these panels?  The 3d graphics 
did not print very well on my copy of the manuscript, so the authors may want to consider 
something to increase their clarity. 
 
We removed this diagram from the revised version to save space and because we 
have already presented a similar diagram in Riegels, et al., 2011. 
 
Comments from Reviewer 3: 
 
This paper uses an iterative hydro-economic optimization modeling to analyze the effects of 
different water and energy pricing policies on surface and groundwater resources. This 
combination or pricing, conjunctive water sources, and hydro-economics will be of interest to 
journal readers as will the results of the different price policies and what they mean for 
agricultural activities. 
 
I had a difficult time following how the iterative optimization modeling method works and the 
methodology could be explained more clearly. I would suggest working from a global 
explanation: first explain the overarching optimization problem (decision variables, objective 
function, and constraints), how the various surface/groundwater, PMP, environmental and 
other components fit into the global optimization problem, and finally how the gradient search 
method iterates to find the globally optimal prices. The only optimization formulation presented 
(Equation 5) seems incomplete (only presents the PMP formulation?) and missing several of the 
key components which determine the optimal set of water prices.  
 
Some more on the methods: much of the description of the methods focuses on the various 
assumptions made. Numerous assumptions are required for this kind of study and that is fine 
and even helpful as far transparency of work done. But the mathematical notation indicates 
both the economical and hydrological data and modeling are disaggregated by water use 
location whereas the text reads like there was an assumption used that the economic data is 
constant across the basin. Also, the paper never explains how the two pricing scenarios were 
actually implemented in the model. Thus, I would like to see the authors clarify the 
aggregation/disaggregation used in each model sub-component, how they integrate (see also 
the previous paragraph), and what parameter or structure changes were made to represent the 
pricing scenarios. 
 
Additionally, I would suggest the authors use a more active writing style in the methods to focus 
on the work actually done rather than assumptions made.  
 
We have re-written the Methods section following these suggestions. 
 
Another major area for improvement is in the abstract and introduction. Currently they jump 
right in with the methodology undertaken (comparing two pricing policies). A much broader 
view is needed—what is the current problem motivating the work, why is it necessary to 
compare two pricing policies, and what is the contribution of the paper? Without this context, 
it’s hard to evaluate whether the comparisons, methods, and results are appropriate.  
 
We have re-written the Abstract and Introduction following these suggestions. 
 
This is still a paper I would encourage the authors to revise and resubmit according to my 
comments. Below, additional line-by-line comments elaborate on and add to these general 
points. 
 
1. Line 49. “’environmental and resource costs’”. If this term is in quotes so early in the 
intro, it should be defined. 
 
We have removed the discussion in which this phrase appeared from the 
Introduction. We decided that it was enough to refer to the challenge of 
designing economic instruments to implement WFD objectives without 
getting into a discussion of the interpretation of the term “environmental and 
resource costs”. 
 
2. Line 77, “Probably the most significant…” In the intro, this statement should be more 
definitive. It is either the most significant or it is not. 
 
We have removed the discussion of the pros and cons of volumetric pricing 
from the introduction in order to focus on the systems analysis approach 
presented here, as we feel that this is the major contribution of this paper. 
 
3. Line 87. “bionomial tariffs (combining…)”. The definition is fine but I have never before 
heard the term bionomial. In the U.S. these tariff structures are simply referred to as 
rate structures with fixed and variable charges. Also, in the U.S., these structures are not 
limited to agriculture -- many municipal U.S. water providers often use them too. 
 
Same comment as above. 
 
4. Line 106. So I’m still unclear what exactly is the problem motivating the work? What will 
be done in this paper? What is the contribution? 
 
We have addressed this comment by re-writing the abstract and introduction 
as suggested in this reviewer’s general comments. 
 
5. Lines 120-125. I’m confused about what is happening. In the optimization model, what 
is the objective function and constraints? Are they embedded directly into the model? 
Or tested with some outside simulation model? Is the optimization model choosing the 
price decision variables – or something outside? How are the prices used to estimate 
annual water demands? Again, is this part of the optimization, simulation, or something 
else? Then, “simulated flows and groundwater storage levels are checked…” Again, this 
sounds like this is part of the simulation… but shouldn’t it be a constraint in the 
optimization? To clarify all this, I would suggest more formally writing the optimization 
formulation in mathematical form on which the iterative approach is based. 
 
We have addressed this comment by re-writing the Methods section as 
suggested in this reviewer’s general comments. We now begin the Methods 
section with a formal statement of the overall optimization problem (lines 
101-104). 
 
6. Line 130. “gradient search”. What ensures the global optimal solution (set of prices) is 
found? If a starting set of prices must first be chosen, then it seems the gradient 
algorithm will point in the direction of steepest descent from the starting point and 
could end up at a local rather than global optimum. 
 
We have added a discussion of the pros and cons of our optimization 
approach to the Discussion section (lines 469-479). 
 
7. Lines 162 – 163. “we assume no wells interfere.” Is this assumption appropriate or for 
mathematical tractability? If the former, the assumption should be substantiated, such 
as using results from the existing groundwater model. 
 
We have provided support for this assumption in lines 167-169. 
 
8. Lines 211-213. OK, here is the optimization formulation. The formulation still needs to 
explain in words what are the decision variables, objective function, and constraints. 
 
We have re-written the Methods section so that the overall optimization 
problem is stated at the beginning (lines 101-112). 
 
9. Lines 214 – 238. So what in the model formulation/implementation actually changes to 
represent the second pricing policy where supply costs equal fixed capital plus operating 
costs? 
 
We now restate the optimization problem that is solved to estimate land use 
changes under the second (Mixed) pricing policy (lines 259-269). 
 
10.  Lines 236-238. Again, how is this assumption regarding responsibility for pumping costs 
implemented in the model?  
 
Pumping costs are incorporated into the supply cost term in Equation 4, 
which is a new equation that has been added to this revised version in order 
to make the welfare estimate for irrigation more clear. We think that it is 
now clear that pumping costs are included in this term under the first 
(Uniform) pricing policy, in which the irrigation operator assumes 
responsibility for groundwater pumping costs. 
 
11. Line 246. From where is the price elasticity of demand estimate derived? From the meta 
analysis data presented by Dalhuisen et al? These elasticities can vary by region and I 
would like to see data more specific to the study site (or, alternatively, sensitivity 
analysis that shows a wide range of elasticities give the same result). 
 
Data specific to the study location were not available. We added text 
explaining that the elasticity value that we assume is similar to the average 
reported by Dalhuisen et al., and we do not investigate sensitivity to this 
assumption because urban/domestic use is less than 5% of total use in the 
case study basin (lines 282-286).  
  
12. Lines 324-329. A few more words would be appropriate to describe how the ecological 
status indicator is actually calculated for intermediate values. Also, how is this indicator 
embedded in the model? I didn’t see anything of this sort in the two constraints in 
Equation 5. 
 
More details about how the ecological status indicator is estimated have been 
added (lines 342-363). More information about how the indicator is used in 
the optimization approach is given in the statement of the overall 
optimization problem that has been added to the beginning of the Methods 
section (lines 91-104), and also in the summary of the overall optimization 
problem that has been added to the end of the Methods section (lines 388-
408). We think these additions make it clear how the ecological status 
indicator functions as a constraint in the overall optimization approach. 
 
13. Line 367. “Predicted at one irrigation water use location…” Is there a way to synthesize 
results to show impacts at and across more locations? 
 
We have aggregated the results presented in this paragraph (lines 419-430) 
and in Table 2 across all irrigation water users that have access to both 
surface water and groundwater supplies. We have not aggregated results 
presented in the next paragraph (lines 432-436) or in Table 3 because the 
comparison of marginal costs would not be meaningful if aggregated across 
water use locations. 
 
 
 
 
